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ABSTRACT:  Digitization, sophisticated fiber-optic networks, and the resultant 
convergence of the media, communications and information technology industries 
have completely transformed the communications landscape in the last couple of 
decades.  New contingent business and social models were created that have been 
mirrored in the amended communications regimes.  Yet, despite an overhaul of the 
communications regulation paradigm, the status of, and the rules on universal service 
have remained surprisingly intact, both during and after the liberalization exercise. 
The present paper looks into this paradox and examines the sustainability of the 
existing concept of universal service. It suggests that there is a need for a novel 
concept of universal service in the digital networked communications environment, 
whose objectives go beyond the conventional internalizing and redistributional 
rationales, and concentrate on communication and information networks as a public 
good, where not only access to infrastructure but also access to content may be 
essential. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Universal service is a convoluted concept.  On one hand, it may 
seem as simple as the goal of providing a “telephone in every home,”1 
while, on the other hand, it may be indefinitely complex if construed in 
the context of human rights and/or the role of the state.  The concept of 
universal service may also be a misleading one.  Indeed, it is endowed 
with different meanings in different contexts, particularly in the 
political (if not in the academic) domain.  It is used simultaneously to 
connote a public policy objective and a public policy instrument for 
the achievement of other policy goals.  Universal service is not a 
concept that exists independently from other concerns.  It entails a 
number of heterogeneous objectives and, as we shall see below, these 
may evolve over time.  Moreover, universal service is in constant 
(more or less direct) interaction with a plethora of other government 
policies and with the actions of state agencies and private parties with 
regard to both its formulation and its implementation.  The definition 
of universal service and its mix of ingredients also vary from sector to 
sector and from country to country, although certain common patterns 
are discernible.2 
 This already fuzzy picture is complicated by the fact that universal 
service is set in an environment that is in a state of perpetual flux.  
This is especially true for the communications sector, which has 
undergone radical changes in the last two decades in terms of rapid 
technological advances and market developments.  Digitization, 
sophisticated fiber-optic networks, and the resultant convergence of 
the media, communications, and information technology industries 
have completely transformed the communications landscape.3 New 
contingent business and social models were created, which have been 
mirrored in the amended communications regimes.  Yet, despite an 
overhaul of the communications regulation paradigm the status of, and 
the rules on universal service have remained surprisingly intact both 
 
1 Colin R. Blackman, “Universal Service: Obligation or Opportunity?” Telecommunications 
Policy 19, no. 3 (1995): 171. 
2 European Commission, “Liberalisation of Network Industries: Economic Implications and 
Main Policy Issues,” Report of the DG for Economic and Financial Affairs, no. 4 (Brussels, 
1999), 185-188. 
3 See, e.g., Christopher T. Marsden, ed., Regulating the Global Information Society 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2000). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120282
2007] NENOVA 119 
 
 
 
 
 
during and after the liberalization and reregulation of the 
communications markets. 
 One of the tasks of this paper is to look into this alleged paradox of 
why the rules remain static in such a dynamic environment.  The 
second and core task is to identify the concept of universal service, its 
nature, and precise contours beyond “the stuff of myth, [the] slippery 
and ideological concept which has been used and manipulated by 
different parties to support their own case for special treatment.”4 
Based upon observations on previous conceptualizations of universal 
service and the developments of communications markets and their 
societal repercussions, this paper will draw conclusions on the need for 
a novel concept of universal service in a digital networked 
communications environment.  We shall not delineate the specific 
parameters and contents of future universal service policies.  Instead, 
we propose a readjustment of the debate on the universal service 
concept as part of the broader governance discussions on the 
appropriate regulatory model(s) for electronic communications. 
 The paper addresses the above issues in four parts.  The first part 
outlines with a few broad brushstrokes the stages in the development 
of the universal service concept with a focus on the European 
Community (“EC”) legal framework.5  The second part draws upon 
this historical background, the current state of the EC universal service 
regime, and the proposed changes thereto to elaborate on the nature 
and the dynamics of the concept of universal service.  Part three of the 
paper analyzes the sustainability of this concept and argues the need 
for its reformulation.  Part four draws conclusions and suggests a new 
approach toward universal service issues. 
 Before proceeding, a few caveats regarding our analysis are 
necessary.  First, we shall limit our investigation to the concept of 
universal service and shall not elaborate on the various present or 
future mechanisms for implementing or funding universal service 
obligations (“USOs”).6 Although the question of “how” is critical, we 
 
4 Blackman, “Universal Service,” supra note 1, at 171. 
5 For a detailed analysis of universal service in the EC context and a comprehensive 
comparison between the old and the new regimes, see Paul Nihoul and Peter Rodford, EU 
Electronic Communications Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5.01-5.350. 
6 For an overview of the implementation and funding approaches, see European Commission, 
“Liberalisation of Network Industries,” supra note 2, at 178-184.  See also Michael Tyler, 
William Letwin, and Christopher Roe, “Universal Service and Innovation in 
Telecommunication Services,” Telecommunications Policy 19, no. 1 (1995): 3-20.  Jayakar 
and Sawhney present an excellent overview of the different options for designing future 
universal services obligations, in particular with regard to the distribution and financing of the 
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attempt to answer the “what” and “why” questions.  Second, the 
analysis is based on the law and practice of universal service of the 
European Union (“EU”) with occasional reference to developments in 
the United States, which essentially means that our perspective will be 
confined to that of developed countries.7  Finally, note that we should 
analyze universal service and not the broader concept of public 
service.  Although related, the two concepts are by no means 
synonymous.  As we shall see below, they might have had similar 
origins, but they also reflect different attitudes of policymakers and 
have essentially different contents.8 
II. THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
A.  THE ROOTS OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICIES 
 The concept of universal service has its roots in some almost 
notorious developments in the United States at the dawn of the 
twentieth century.9  As the legend goes, it was Theodore Vail, then 
Chairman of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(“AT&T”), who convinced the government that a regulated monopoly 
with universal service obligations was a better model to adopt than a 
system of traffic interexchange among competing networks.10  Vail 
called for the creation of a single, common, uniform, and nationwide 
telecommunications network whose services would be available to all 
 
universal service obligations.  See Krishna P. Jayakar and Harmeet Sawhney, “Universal 
Service: Beyond Established Practice to Possibility Space,” Telecommunications Policy 28, 
no. 3-4 (2004): 346-349. 
7 See, e.g., Farid Gasmi, Jean-Jacques Laffont, and William W. Sharkey, “Competition, 
Universal Service and Telecommunications Policy in Developing Countries,” Information 
Economics and Policy 12, no. 3 (2000): 221-248; Xinzhu Zhang, Jean-Jacques Laffont, and 
Antonio Estache, “Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries,” World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper Series no. 3421 (2004). 
8 European Commission, “Liberalisation of Network Industries,” supra note 2, at 168-170. 
9 An excellent reference on the development of the US telecommunications system and 
universal service is Milton L. Mueller, Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, and 
Monopoly in the Making of the American Telephone System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1997).  See also Milton L. Mueller, “Universal Service in Telephone History: A 
Reconstruction,” Telecommunications Policy 17, no. 5 (1993): 352-369. 
10 These networks were locally developed by some 6000 independents across the US after the 
expiration of AT&T’s telephone patents.  The local networks varied in standards and quality 
and were (willingly or not) most often incompatible with one another. 
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users in all locations.11  The subsequent adoption of the Willis-Graham 
Act in 1921 marked the end of the competitive era in U.S. telecom 
markets.  By exempting telephone companies from the Sherman Act, 
the Willis-Graham Act opened the way to monopoly, which was 
supposed to cater for universal service provision.  The 1934 
Communications Act affirmed the subsidized universal penetration 
model.  Although it made no explicit reference to universal service as 
such, it charged the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
with the task of giving all U.S. citizens a national and global 
telecommunications service, provided by AT&T at an affordable 
price.12  Despite the appealing grandeur of this history, it should be 
noted that what Vail intended at that time was the creation of a 
nationally interconnected and interoperable telephone system, rather 
than a service for everyone13 as we would construe it today. 
 In the EC as a supranational entity, the conceptualization of 
universal service and the need for formulating a comprehensive policy 
in this respect came understandably much later than in the United 
States, with the commencement of liberalization of the telecom sector.  
Until then, in the landscape of strictly national monopolies, there was 
no need for such a policy at the European level.  Universal service 
obligations did exist but were considered a national matter of the 
member states.  The pre-liberalization Post, Telegraph, and Telephone 
(“PTT”) monopoly model14 had, as one of its core objectives, and 
indeed as its justification, the provision of universal service as part of 
 
11 The campaign launched by Theodore Vail was under the slogan “One Policy, One System, 
Universal Service.” The original document is available at AT&T, “One Policy, One System, 
Universal Service,” Advertisement, http://www.att.com/history/milestone_1908.html 
(accessed October 1, 2006). 
12 “For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire 
and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, 
without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, 
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate 
facilities at reasonable charges . . . ”  See Communications Act of 1934, U.S. Code 47 (2000), § 
151. 
13 Milton L. Mueller, “Universal Service in Telephone History: A Reconstruction,” supra note 
9. 
14 On the PTT model, see Oliver Stehmann, Network Competition for European 
Telecommunications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 78-79; see also Damien 
Geradin and Michel Kerf, Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 6-7. 
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the public service.15  It was widely assumed at the time that state 
ownership was sufficient to guarantee PTT action in the public 
interest.  “[T]he state was seen as a ‘stopgap’ for tasks that the private 
sector could not provide”16 and the PTTs were viewed accordingly “as 
instruments of government policy contributing to macroeconomic and 
microeconomic policy goals, including the provision of universal 
service.”17 
 In reality, most PTTs never came close to providing universal 
service in the sense of access to the public telephone network to all 
locations.  The PTTs’ levels of economic efficiency and their 
responsiveness to customer needs were poor and in almost all aspects, 
the “idealistic theory of public service failed dramatically in 
practice.”18  Similarly, in the United States, while AT&T provided 
local telephony below cost through cross-subsidization between long-
distance and local traffic, it did not achieve universal geographical 
rollout of its services.  In fact, it took until the 1960s for appropriate 
levels of penetration to be reached due mostly to a reduction in 
connection costs and a vigorous market demand.19 
 
15 Public service is a term usually used to describe services provided by a government to its 
citizens, either directly (through the public sector) or by financing private provision of 
services.  The term is widely associated with the common consensus that certain services 
should be available to all, regardless of income.  On public service in Europe, see Tony 
Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law: Markets and Public Services (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 96-173.  For a comparison between public service and universal 
service, see Nihoul and Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 5.318-
5.324. 
16 Johannes M. Bauer, “Universal Service in the European Union” Government Information 
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1999): 332. 
17 Ibid. 
18 William H. Melody, “Policy Objectives and Models of Regulation,” in Telecom Reform: 
Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices, William H. Melody, ed. (Lyngby: Technical 
University of Denmark, 1997), 17. 
19 See Paschal Preston and Roderick Flynn, “Rethinking Universal Service: Citizenship, 
Consumption Norms and the Telephone,” The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 92-93, as 
referred to by Seamus Simpson, “Universal Service Issues in Converging Communications 
Environments: The Case of the UK,” Telecommunications Policy 28, no. 3-4 (2004): 235.  See 
also Nicholas Garnham, “Universal Service,” in Melody, Telecom Reform, supra note 18, at 
200. 
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B.  UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN A POST-LIBERALIZATION ERA 
 It is now beyond doubt that competition in telecommunications 
(both in the sense of opening of markets and privatization of the 
telecommunications operator) is beneficial20 and does not endanger 
the provision of universal service.21  The liberalization of the 
telecommunications markets and the related reform of the state 
intervention model were, however, not a work of magic following a 
sudden neo-liberal realization of the positive effects of market 
mechanisms.  The transformation of the communications industry was 
made possible through “a series of steps, each controversial and 
painful”22 and took almost fifteen years to complete.  It was driven by 
the technological breakthroughs in the telecommunications industry 
that can be summarized under the three broad headings of: 
(i) digitization; (ii) invention and upgrading of the transistor; and 
(iii) perfection of the optical fiber.23  These had a profound impact on 
the telecommunications markets and their organization, necessitating 
an appropriate regulatory framework.24  In the concrete context of 
examining universal service, the liberalization of telecommunications 
markets meant that the previously existing public service type of 
regulation of the sector needed modification and the contours of USOs 
were to be set anew. 
 
 
20 For examples on the beneficial role of competition, see Stephen Davies, Heather Coles, 
Matthew Olczak, Christopher Pike, and Christopher Wilson, “The Benefits from Competition: 
Some Illustrative UK Cases,” DTI Economics Paper, no. 9 (July 2004).  For the benefits of 
deregulation in telecommunications, see J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber, 
“Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries,” Yale Journal on Regulation 
15, no. 1 (1998): 117-147. 
21 Economic Policy Committee, Annual Report on Structural Reforms 2002, 
ECFIN/EPC/117/02-EN (Brussels, March 5, 2002).  See also Swiss Federal Council, 
Botschaft zur Bundesbeteiligung am Unternehmen Swisscom AG, BBl 2006 3763 (April 
2006) (Message of the Federal Council on the Federal Participation in the Swisscom 
Corporation). 
22 Eli M. Noam, Interconnecting the Network of Networks (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2001), 1. 
23 See Milton L. Mueller, “Digital Convergence and Its Consequences,” (1999): 2, 
http://dcc.syr.edu/miscarticles/rp1.pdf (accessed October 1, 2006); David Gillies and Roger 
Marshall, Telecommunications Law 1, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003), 9. 
24 See, e.g., European Commission, Fifth Report on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(99) 537 final, 1999, 5.  For a detailed 
analysis, see Mira Burri Nenova, EC, Electronic Communications: Can Competition Law Do 
It All?, chap. 1 (forthcoming 2007; on file with the author). 
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 As mentioned above, the EC did not have a clear-cut universal 
service policy because the EC deemed the provision of public services 
a national matter until the opening of telecommunications to 
competition.  With the formulation of European telecommunications 
policy, however, which commenced with the Green Paper on the 
Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications 
Services and Equipment25 in 1987, the idea of providing certain “basic 
services” was taken into consideration.26 The preservation of universal 
service at the Community level was indeed an important bargaining 
chip, which the European Commission used vis-à-vis the member 
states in order to efficiently implement its ambitious deregulation 
plan.27 
 Within the Open Network Provision (“ONP”) model, which 
provided for asymmetric sectoral rules that assisted the liberalization 
of EC telecommunications,28 universal service was for the first time 
regulated at the Community level.  It rested on three major principles:  
(i) equality, i.e., access must be offered independently of 
location to all;  
(ii) continuity, i.e., a specified quality29 must be offered all the 
time; and  
 
25 European Commission, Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for 
Telecommunications Services and Equipment: Towards a Dynamic European Economy, 
COM(87) 290 final, 1987. 
26 Ibid., 42.  The document did not mention universal service as such, but it discussed the 
possibility of maintaining exclusive or special rights with respect to the provider of a limited 
number of basic services.  It built on previous discussions: see European Commission, 
Communication on the Consultation on the Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications 
Services Sector, COM(93) 159 final, 1993; European Commission, Developing Universal 
Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, COM(93) 543, 1993, 4. 
27 On the pro-active role of the European Commission, see, e.g., Herbert Ungerer, “Access 
Issues under EU Regulation and Antitrust Law: The Case of Telecommunications and Internet 
Markets,” (working paper, Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA, July 2000), 12-13, http://www.pirp.harvard.edu/publications/pdf-
blurb.asp?id=479 (accessed October 1, 2006).  For an excellent analysis of the EC 
telecommunications regime and its evolution, see Pierre Larouche, Competition Law and 
Regulation in European Telecommunications (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart, 2000), 1-36. 
28 On the ONP framework, see Larouche, Competition Law, supra note 27, at 25-32. 
29 Pursuant to parameters and methodologies specified by the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute. 
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(iii) affordability, i.e., a certain price level for basic services 
affordable for all must be assured.30 
Following these principles, Directive 97/33/EC31 and Directive 
98/10/EC32 identified “universal service” as “a defined minimum set 
of services of specified quality which is available to all users 
independent of their geographic location and, in the light of specific 
national conditions, at an affordable price.”33  This “minimum set of 
services” included at the time of liberalization: (i) access to the fixed 
public telephone network at a fixed location; (ii) access to fixed public 
telephone services enabling users to make and receive national and 
international calls, supporting speech, facsimile and/or data 
communications; (iii) directory services; (iv) public pay phones; and 
(v) certain measures for disabled users and users with special social 
needs.34 The implementation of these provisions secured, during the 
arguably turbulent and unstable process of liberalization the 
availability and affordability of telecommunications services of certain 
quality. 
 
30 In the EC context, “affordable price” means a price defined by the member states at national 
levels in the light of specific national conditions and may involve setting common tariffs 
irrespective of location or special tariff options to deal with the needs of low-income users.  
The affordability of telephone service is related to the information, which users receive 
regarding telephone usage expenses, as well as the relative cost of telephone usage compared 
to other services, and is also related to their ability to control expenditure.  Affordability, 
therefore, means also giving power to consumers through obligations imposed on undertakings 
designated as USOs providers (e.g., a specified level of itemized billing or the possibility for 
consumers selectively to block certain calls, such as high-priced calls to premium services).  
For details regarding the current EC regime, see Article 9 of Directive 2002/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on Universal Service and Users’ 
Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, Eur. O.J. L108/51 
(April 24, 2002). 
31 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on 
Interconnection in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring Universal Service and 
Interoperability through Application of the Principles of the Open Network Provision (ONP), 
Eur. O.J. L199/32 (July 26, 1997) (hereinafter “Directive 97/33/EC”). 
32 Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on 
the Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony and on Universal 
Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, Eur. O.J. L101/24 (April 1, 
1998) (hereinafter “Directive 98/10/EC”). 
33 Directive 97/33/EC, Article 2(1)(g), and Directive 98/10/EC, 2(2)(f). 
34 Directive 98/10/EC, Articles 5-8.  See also Directive 97/33/EC, Annex I. 
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 The accomplishment of the liberalization process was, however, 
not an end in itself.  Indeed, due to its success there was a need for a 
fresh regulatory approach that would reflect the new competitive 
communications environment and the pronounced trends of 
convergence and globalization.35  With the benefit of hindsight, one 
can even say that the post-liberalization system proved to be a much 
harder regulatory puzzle than the transition system, since it required 
the establishment of a sustainable regulatory model.  The 2002 EC 
framework for electronic communications networks and services36 was 
the response to this need and attempted to meet the challenge.  It 
envisaged a few novel regulatory solutions, the most prominent of 
which were: (i) the clear separation of network/transmission from 
content in the regulatory structure;37 (ii) the alignment of the sector-
 
35 The 1999 Communications Review, which was in essence the proposal of the European 
Commission for a new regulatory framework for electronic communications, identified the 
following issues that needed to be considered in the new regime: (i) convergence of 
telecommunications, broadcasting, and information technology sectors; (ii) globalization of 
technologies and markets; (iii) mergers and acquisitions changing the nature of the industry 
and relationships between key players; (iv) the role of the Internet in overturning traditional 
market structures and blurring the distinction between voice and data transmission; (v) 
improvements in processing, access and basic technologies, in particular wave division 
multiplexing on optical fibers and digital subscriber loops; (vi) the emergence of wireless 
applications; (vii) software re-configurable technologies designed to meet the specific local 
market requirements; and (viii) the development of new technologies within the media sector, 
in particular digital TV.  See European Commission, Towards a New Framework for 
Electronic Communications Infrastructure and Associated Services: the 1999 
Communications Review, COM(99) 537 final, 1999, 1-2. 
36 See Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 
Eur. O.J. L108/33 (April 24, 2002) (hereinafter the “Framework Directive”); Directive 
2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the 
Authorization of Electronic Communications Networks and Services, Eur. O.J. L108/21 (April 
24, 2002); Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and 
Associated Facilities, Eur. O.J. L108/7 (April 24, 2002); Directive 2002/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on Universal Service and Users’ 
Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, Eur. O.J. L108/51 
(April 24, 2002) (hereinafter the “Universal Service Directive”); Directive 2002/58/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of 
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, Eur. 
O.J. L201/37 (April 24, 2002).  See also Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 
2002 on Competition in the Markets for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 
Eur. O.J. L249/21 (Sept. 17, 2002) (hereinafter the “Commission Competition Directive”). 
37 The regime regulates only electronic communications services, electronic communications 
networks, associated facilities, and associated services, as defined in Article 2 of the 
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specific rules with the methodology and practice of EC antitrust, 
including market-by-market sunset clauses triggering the withdrawal 
of sectoral rules;38 and (iii) the introduction of the principle of 
technological neutrality.39 
 The 2002 package also featured a new Universal Service Directive 
which remained true to the principles of equality, continuity, and 
affordability and defined the scope of the USOs as encompassing: 
(i) access location to the public telephone network; (ii) access to 
publicly available telephone services at a fixed location to enable end-
users to make and receive local, national, and international telephone 
calls, as well as facsimile and data communications; (iii) directory 
services; (iv) public pay telephones; and (v) certain specific measures 
for disabled users such as those with low income or special social 
needs.40 
 If one compares the above USO definition with the pre-
liberalization USO scope previously outlined above, it is striking how 
little has changed.41 The parameters of the USOs are practically the 
same.  Legitimate questions that arise are what has changed since the 
liberalization? Have the introduction of competition and the “new” 
telecom order changed anything at all? Most notably, these questions 
will remain relevant even after the forthcoming review of the EC 
communications regime that is to take place by the end of 2006,42 
 
Framework Directive.  Broadcasting content, financial services, and certain information 
society services remain beyond its scope of application. 
38 On the new mechanism for regulating dominance (the Significant Market Power regime), 
see Articles 14-16 of the Framework Directive, supra note 36.  See also Alexandre de Streel, 
“The Integration of Competition Law Principles in the New European Regulatory Framework 
for Electronic Communications,” World Competition 26, no. 3 (2003): 489-514; Martin Cave, 
“Economic Aspects of the New Regulatory Regime for Electronic Communications Service,” 
in The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications, ed. Pierre A. Buigues 
and Patrick Rey, 27-41 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004); Nihoul and Rodford, EU 
Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 3.213-3.316. 
39 Framework Directive, supra note 36, at Article 8(1).  See also Nihoul and Rodford, EU 
Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 7.128-7.129. 
40 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Articles 4-9. 
41 If one carefully compares the two definitions, the only difference is the deletion of “fixed” 
under point (i).  There were no changes in practical terms either.  See Economic Policy 
Committee, Annual Report on Structural Reforms 2002, supra note 21, at 17. 
42 European Commission, On the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, COM(06) 334 final, 2006. 
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since despite the breadth of the discussions and the acknowledgement 
of the transformed communications system, there are no projected 
material changes to the USO.43 
C.  INTERIM OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF UNIVERSAL 
SERVICE 
 The situation outlined above may be described as a paradox where, 
upon significant changes in both the regulated environment and the 
regulation itself, a single institute, namely that of universal service, 
remains intact.  This paradox may be best explained by the politics 
behind universal service conceptualization, or to put it radically, in the 
words of Nicholas Garnham, that universal service rationale has been 
“mobilised as an attempted defence of the telephone monopoly.”44 
Indeed, the “universal service” justification is still a strong political 
argument, and one that enjoys surprisingly broad (almost automatic) 
support even now that the liberalization exercise is complete.  In 
Switzerland, for instance, universal service was recently successfully 
used as a defense of state control and against the withdrawal of the 
Federal participation in the Swiss telecommunications incumbent.45 
Yet we argue that, although seemingly little has been altered, a few 
key “ingredients” of the overall universal service policy have certainly 
changed.  First, in the context of competitive communications, there 
are new tools for the provision of USOs.  There is, above all, an 
emphasis on the role of the market in the achievement of the defined 
universal service objectives.  The priority role of the market takes 
different dimensions depending on the situation.  In the EC context for 
instance, member states are obliged to “determine the most efficient 
 
43 European Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome of the Review of the Scope of 
Universal Service in Accordance with Article 15(2) of Directive 2002/22/EC, COM(06) 163 
final, 2006, 5.  Although the findings of the European Commission are that the scope of the 
universal service should remain unchanged, it put forward for discussion some interesting 
long-term issues related to the redefinition of the USOs (e.g. exclusion of public payphones 
and directory services or separation of access to infrastructure from access to services). 
44 Garnham, “Universal Service,” supra note 19, at 200.  See also Thomas Hart, “A Dynamic 
Universal Service for a Heterogenous European Union,” Telecommunications Policy 22, no. 
10 (1998): 840; Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, Competition in Telecommunications: 
Munich Lectures in Economics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 218. 
45 See, e.g., Christian Levrat, “Der Bund ist der richtige Swisscom-Aktionär” (The Federation 
is the Right Swisscom Shareholder), Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Dec. 2005); Swiss Federal 
Council, Botschaft, supra note 21, at 3770. 
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and appropriate approach for ensuring the implementation of universal 
service, while respecting the principles of objectivity, transparency, 
non-discrimination and proportionality”46 and to seek a minimization 
of market distortions.47  Consequently, no market player is a priori 
excluded from designation for provision of universal service,48 and all 
undertakings present on the communications markets are eligible 
under an efficient, objective, transparent, and non-discriminatory 
designation mechanism.49  Further, appointed operators must not 
necessarily be nationals of the member state, and undertakings from 
other geographic markets (e.g., U.S. or Swiss companies) or other 
sectors (e.g., from the electricity industry50) could enter the 
designation procedures. 
 A second element added to the post-liberalization universal regime 
that is linked to the above, but may also be considered distinctly, is its 
built-in flexibility.  For instance, EC member states may now 
designate more than one undertaking, or designate different 
undertakings or sets of undertakings, to provide different elements of 
the universal service, or to cover different parts of the national 
territory.51  This fragmentation of the mandate allows for competition 
between undertakings in the provision of universal service and 
therefore greater efficiency.  In view of the inherent dynamism of 
communications, the flexibility of the new EC regime is further 
ensured by the periodic review of the scope of USO.52  The review is 
to be undertaken “in the light of social, economic and technological 
developments, taking into account, inter alia, mobility and data rates 
in the light of the prevailing technologies used by the majority of 
 
46 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 3(2).  
47 Ibid.; see also Commission Competition Directive, supra note 36, at Article 6. 
48 Contrary to the previous regime.  See Article 4(c)(1) of Commission Directive 90/388 on 
Competition in the Markets for Telecommunications Services, Eur. O.J. L192/10 (July 24, 
1990); Directive 97/33/EC, Article 5(1). 
49 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 8(2). 
50 See European Commission, “High-speed Internet Access via the Electricity Grid: 
Commission Seeks to Create New Market Opportunities,” Press Release IP/05/403, Brussels, 
April 8, 2005.  See also European Commission, Draft Commission Recommendation of 6 
April 2005 on Broadband Electronic Communications through Powerlines, C(05) 1031, 2005. 
51 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 8(1). 
52 See Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 15(1). 
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subscribers.”53 The review process could thus, accounting for new 
developments in society in terms of needs for and spread of 
technologies, and considering the developments in technology itself, 
adjust the parameters of universal service at the EC level.54 
 On a more general level, a third conclusion that could be drawn 
from the development of EC communications law is that the generic 
benefits of competition, i.e., the pure economic rationales of 
competition for achieving efficiency,55 have come to the forefront.  As 
already mentioned, this means in essence that the overall thrust of the 
EC liberalization model is upon the market.  This “economic turn,”56 
reflecting the conventional Western economies’ wisdom is, however, 
to be seen together with a certain “public turn,” whereby certain public 
interest objectives are clearly defined and pursued.57 
 In conclusion, we suggest that there has been some readjustment.  
However, we cannot exaggerate its magnitude: it is just a “bunny-hop” 
and not a giant leap.  Besides the realization that communications 
markets, the technology, and the needs of the consumers have 
changed, the concept of universal service remains relatively sticky and 
there has been no real breakthrough in the pre-liberalization thinking.  
While the talks on the new nature of universal service and the need for 
adaptation have been going on for more than ten years,58 both in 
 
53 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 15(2).  See also Annex V thereof. 
54 See European Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome, supra note 43, at 6. 
55 The consumer welfare approach sees competition as ensuring allocative, productive, and 
dynamic efficiency in the economy.  Collectively, these generic benefits of competition 
provide maximization of wealth at the lowest possible cost to society, the consumer being the 
ultimate beneficiary of the competitive market forces. 
56 On the economic turn of EC competition law, for instance, see Mel Kenny, The 
Transformation of Public and Private EC Competition Law (Berne: Staempfli, 2002), 101-
218.  See also Advisory Group for Competition Policy (EAGCP), “DG Competition 
Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses,” 
EAGCP Report for DG COMP (July 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/ 
others/discpaper2005.pdf (accessed October 1, 2006). 
 
57 A similar “public turn” observation has been made by Herbert Burkert in the context of EC 
telecommunications policy.  See Herbert Burkert, “The Post-Deregulatory Landscape in 
International Telecommunications Law: A Unique European Union Approach,” Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 27, no. 3 (2002): 739-816. 
58 See, e.g., Robert H. Anderson et al., Universal Access to E-mail: Feasibility and Societal 
Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995); Blackman, “Universal Service,” supra note 
1, at 171-175. 
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academia and policy circles, they have largely remained just talks.  
Policymakers have stuck to the classical paradigm of universal service, 
but the solutions offered are barely sustainable and begin “to look 
increasingly like ‘band-aid’ solutions that cover up the internal 
contradictions.”59 In the following sections, we argue that a more 
radical readjustment is needed that relates, above all, to the concept of 
universal service. 
III.  READJUSTING THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE DEBATE 
 For readjusting the focus of the universal service debate we 
suggest that one should not equate the universal service regimes 
(previous, current, or future) with the societal goals behind USO.60  “It 
is important to understand […] history and how, at different stages of 
development of telecommunications networks, universal service will 
have different meanings and emphases.”61  Upon closer examination 
of these different stages,62 it is apparent that, although the meaning of 
universal service and how it is pursued vary, there is “an underlying 
unity of aim.”63  Equity, continuity, and affordability certainly remain 
as its defining principles.  They are, however, not ends in themselves, 
but must be seen in the broad context of state intervention and the 
public interest.  In this context, they reflect the major justifications of 
public intervention in the economy, in particular market failures and 
redistributive considerations.  Historically these validations stem from 
the service public tradition, which is well established in all European 
 
59 Jayakar & Sawhney, “Universal Service,” supra note 6, at 346.  
60 See, e.g., Milton L. Mueller, “Universal Service Policies as Wealth Distribution,” 
Government Information Quarterly 16, No. 4 (1999): 353-358; Garnham, “Universal Service,” 
supra note 19, at 199-204. 
61 Blackman, “Universal Service,” supra note 1, at 172.  See also Jayakar and Sawhney, 
“Universal Service,” supra note 6, at 341-342. 
62 Claire Milne, “Stages of Universal Service Policy,” Telecommunications Policy 22, no. 9 
(1998): 776. 
63 Ibid., 777.  Claire Milne identifies the following common elements: (i) universal service is 
desired for social or political reasons and includes a notion of “equity;” (ii) achievement of 
universal service is apparently not commercially viable; (iii) it is recognized that definitions 
will change as society and technology change; (iv) definitions cover what are seen as “basic 
telecom services” i.e., well established, relatively cheap, and very important to ordinary 
people; (v) adequate quality of service is defined or understood; and (vi) service must be 
affordable by those for whom it is designed. 
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countries64 and linked to the notion of citizenship.65  While the 
institute of universal service is more limited in scope than that of 
public service and does not address considerations like the long-term 
impact of investment decisions or environmental effects, it does 
contribute to the achievement of certain “public service” objectives.  
These can be broadly summarized under three categories: 
(i) internalization of network externalities; (ii) redistribution between 
users (of different locations and/or income groups); and (iii) the 
realization of some public goods (such as an all-encompassing 
communications network).66 We advocate in this line construing 
universal service as a tool for the achievement of the societal goals 
within the above triangle of economic and welfare goals, and not as a 
goal in itself, simply equated to a “telephone in every home.”67  
 A second element of the readjustment exercise is the realization 
that universal service is a dynamic concept prone to evolution68 and 
could accommodate, depending on the political environment, different 
concrete sub-objectives framed within the above value-triangle.69  We 
can thus think of it as an “empty” concept that may (and hopefully 
will) be filled in the future with content other than telephony.70  This is 
not to say that regulators cannot be pragmatic.  On the contrary, the 
flexibility of the universal service concept allows the construction of 
supplier hybrid models.  Universal service policies would still be 
constrained by the recognition that USOs must be specifically defined 
 
64 See, e.g., Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law, supra note 15. 
65 See ibid., 28-38, 102-106;  Nihoul and Rodford, supra note 5, at 5.319. See also Giuliano 
Amato, “Citizenship and Public Services: Some General Reflections,” in Public Services and 
Citizenship in European Law, ed. Mark Freedland and Silvana Sciarra (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 145-156. 
66 European Commission, “Liberalisation of Network Industries,” supra note 2, at 170. 
67 See Blackman, “Universal Service,” supra note 1.  A similar, albeit more radical, “zero-
based policy” approach is suggested by Pisciotta.  See Aileen Amarandos Pisciotta, “Telecom 
Policy for Information Economies: Unregulation Is Not Enough,” in Networking Knowledge 
for Information Society: Institutions and Intervention, ed. Robin Mansell, Rohan Samarajva, 
and Amy Mahan (Delft: DUP Science 2002), 88. 
68 Nihoul and Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 5.78. 
69 For a critique of the possibility for pursuit of other political objectives, see Mueller, 
“Universal Service Policies as Wealth Distribution,” supra note 60; Garnham, “Universal 
Service,” supra note 19, at 199-204. 
70 See, e.g., “Hearing Voices,” The Economist (October 28, 2004): 21-23. 
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and targeted, transparent, cost-effective, and competitively and 
technologically neutral.71 
 A third element of the shift in the universal service discussion, 
which is logically interlinked with the previous issue, relates to the 
need to understand the profound changes in the communications 
environment, where universal service policies are to be implemented.  
In the next section we briefly elaborate upon the new nature of the 
communications system and cautiously draw the contours of a fitting 
concept of universal service in a digital networked communications 
environment that emphasizes the “public good” dimension of 
communication and information networks. 
IV.  THE NEW CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN A DIGITAL 
NETWORKED COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT 
 As we have already mentioned, the telecommunications sector has 
changed.  However, these changes have not been confined within the 
boundaries of the sector.  The evolution of electronic communications 
and “the continuing development of new technologies for the 
transmission and storage of information [have led] to organisational, 
commercial, technical and legal innovations that are having a profound 
impact on society in general.”72 Furthermore, “[a]s the use of ICT 
[information and communication technology] grows, so does its 
impact on society.”73 Thus, both the quantitative and the qualitative 
ICT-based ramifications are clearly immense.  If, however, we wish to 
observe the changes in the “big picture” and talk of Information 
Society as a general societal phenomenon, it would be rather 
superficial (and largely untrue) to relate its creation and development 
solely to the advances in ICTs.74  We should take into account the 
 
71 OECD, “Rethinking Universal Service for a Next Generation Network Environment,” 
Report of the Working Party on Communication and Information Services Policies, 
DST/ICCP/TISP(2005)5/final (April 18, 2006). 
72 Council of the European Union, “Council Resolution on the Consumer Dimension of the 
Information Society,” Eur. O.J. C23/1 (Jan. 28, 1999), at Recital 1. 
73 European Commission, i2010 – A European Information Society for Growth and 
Employment, COM(05) 229 final (June 1, 2005), 9. 
74 “The Information Technology Revolution DID NOT create the network society.  But 
without technology, the Network Society would not exist.”  Manuel Castells, “An Introduction 
to the Information Age,” in The Information Society Reader, ed. Frank Webster (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 139 (upper case in the original). 
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wider social, political, and cultural processes that have led (and 
continue to lead) to the networked, knowledge-based environment in 
which we live. 
 Although it is almost commonplace now to speak of the 
Information Society,75 there is no single and universally accepted 
theory of its nature and characteristics.  Instead of attempting an 
examination of all the theories,76 we shall use a simplified “working” 
definition of the Information Society, with emphases on its spatial and 
cultural aspects77 and their implications for communications 
regulation.  With this caveat in mind, we can define Information 
Society as a society in which the creation, distribution, and 
manipulation of information78 has become the most significant 
economic and cultural activity.  In its spatial aspect, the Information 
Society could then be construed as information networks, “which 
connect locations and in consequence have dramatic effects on the 
organisation of time and space.”79  These effects could be seen as 
stemming from both the globalization of marketplaces80 and from the 
 
75 The concept of “Information Society” allegedly came into being some forty years ago: the 
economist Fritz Machlup, while examining the U.S. patent system postulated the existence of 
a “knowledge economy” and stressed the role of information.  See Fritz Machlup, The 
Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1962). 
76 See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting 
(1973; repr., New York: Basic Books, 1999); Manuel Castells, The Information Age: 
Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 1, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2000).  For a critique, see Nicholas Garnham, “Information Society Theory as Ideology: A 
Critique,” Studies in Communications Sciences 1 (2001): 129-166.  For an overview of the 
different theories, see Frank Webster, Theories of Information Society (London: Routledge, 
1995); Frank Webster, ed., The Information Society Reader (London: Routledge, 2004).  See 
also Alistair S. Duff, Information Society Studies (London: Routledge, 2001); Christopher 
May, The Information Society: A Sceptical View (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
77 Building upon the analysis of Frank Webster, who identifies five definitions of an 
Information Society, namely: (i) technological; (ii) economic; (iii) occupational; (iv) spatial 
and (v) cultural.  See Webster, Theories of Information Society, supra note 77, at 6-10. 
78 That is information also in the sense of knowledge.  See William H. Dutton, Social 
Transformation in an Information Society: Rethinking Access to You and the World (Paris: 
UNESCO, 2004), 27. 
79 Webster, Theories of Information Society, supra note 76, at 18. 
80 On globalization (in particular economic globalization), see Peter van den Bossche, The 
Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 3-21.  For an excellent collection of contributions on globalization, see David Held and 
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technologies allowing instant communications and data transfer, which 
result ultimately in a “shrinking world.”81  These “time/space 
compressions”82 have multiple repercussions and most notably in our 
context lead to increasing interconnectedness within the information 
networks.  The emergence of all-encompassing global networks 
underlines at the same time the significance of the flow of 
information,83 i.e., the content that is spread through them.  The global 
reach and technological potency of the infrastructures have allowed for 
vast amounts of information to be disseminated.  Now that digitization 
has become ubiquitous, all types of content (audio, video, or text) 
expressed in ones and zeros can be distributed over any network 
(telephone, cable, or mobile) at the speed of light.  New forms of 
communication are emerging (e.g., weblogs84 or online social 
networking platforms85) and these developments, taken together, are 
leading to a fundamental shift in the traditional channels of content 
distribution.86 
 
Anthony McGrew, eds., The Global Transformations Reader, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2003). 
81 See “The Shrinking World: The Impact of Transportation Technology on Effective 
Distance” in Anthony G. Oettinger, “Information Technologies, Government and Governance: 
Some Insights from History,” (Incidental Paper, Program on Information Resources Policy, 
Harvard University, September 1998), http://www.pirp.harvard.edu (accessed October 1, 
2006).  See also John B. Thompson, “The Globalization of Communication,” in Held and 
McGrew, The Global Transformations Reader, supra note 81, 246-259. 
82 As referred to by Anthony Giddens.  See Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: 
Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).  On the “Age of 
Simultaneity,” see, e.g., Neal M. Rosendorf, “Social and Cultural Globalization: Concepts, 
History, and America’s Role,” in Governance in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph S. Nye and 
John D. Donahue (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 109-134. 
83 Webster, Theories of Information Society, supra note 76, at 19, referring to Manuel Castells, 
The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban 
Regional Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). 
84 See, e.g., Dan Gillmor, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People, 
Sebastopol (CA: O’Reilly Media, 2004).  See also PEW Internet & American Life Project, 
“Bloggers: A Portrait of the Internet’s Storytellers,” July 19, 2006, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/ (accessed October 1, 2006). 
85 See, e.g., “MySpace,” http://www.myspace.com; see also “Facebook,” 
http://www.facebook.com. 
86 See, e.g., “Net Dreams: Traditional Media Companies Are Making a Huge Push onto the 
Internet,” The Economist (March 16, 2006): 61-62. 
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 The means of distribution have accordingly changed the content 
being distributed.  The emergence of transnational communication 
conglomerates as key players in the global system of communication 
and information diffusion87 has led to a transformation of the type and 
variety of content being distributed.  Formats and contents of 
television programs, films, and shows have become increasingly 
homogeneous.88  Although this “uniformization” of content does not 
necessarily mean a cultural wasteland,89 it does lead to us being faced 
with a completely altered media and communications environment90 
— an environment that has the potential to acutely affect our culture.91  
To use the words of Manuel Castells,  
[f]or all the science fiction ideology and commercial hype 
surrounding the emergence of the so-called ‘information 
superhighway,’ we can hardly underestimate its significance.  
The potential integration of text, images, and sounds in the 
same system, interacting from multiple points, in chosen 
time (real and delayed) along a global network, in conditions 
of open and affordable access, does fundamentally change 
the character of communication.  And communication 
decisively shapes culture, because, as Postman writes, ‘we 
 
87 See, e.g., Robert W. McChesney, “The New Global Media,” in Held and McGrew, The 
Global Transformations Reader, supra note 80, at 278-285; Christoph Beat Graber, Handel 
und Kultur im Audiovisionsrecht der WTO. Völkerrechtliche, ökonomische und 
kulturpolitische Grundlagen einer globalen Medienordnung (Berne: Staempfli, 2003), 45-50. 
88 For a critique of the cultural industries and on the homogeneity of content, see Graber, 
Handel und Kultur, supra note 88, at 18-21. 
89 See, e.g., Herbert Schiller, “Striving for Communication Dominance: A Half-Century 
Review,” in Electronic Empires: Global Media and Local Resistance, ed. Daya Kishan 
Thussu (London: Edward Arnold, 1998), 17-26. 
90 John B. Thompson, “The Globalization of Communication,” in Held and McGrew, The 
Global Transformations Reader, supra note 80, at 246-259.  Thompson suggests notably that, 
“the appropriation of globalized symbolic materials involves […] the accentuation of symbolic 
distancing from the spatial-temporal contexts of everyday life.”  Ibid., 256 (emphasis in the 
original).  See also Graber, Handel und Kultur, supra note 87, at 22-27. 
91 Castells, The Information Age, supra note 76, at 357 (emphasis added).  For a 
comprehensive analysis of the concept of culture, see Graber, Handel und Kultur, supra note 
87, at 11-36.  See also Nicholas Garnham, Emancipation, the Media, and Modernity: 
Arguments about the Media and Social Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 140-
164; Anthony D. Smith, “Towards a Global Culture,” in Held and McGrew, The Global 
Transformations Reader, supra note 80, 278-285. 
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do not see … reality … as ‘it’ is, but as our languages are.  
And our languages are our media.  Our media are our 
metaphors.  Our metaphors create the content of our 
culture.’92 
 As a conclusion to the above account of some implications of the 
Information Society, we identify two points of significance in our 
specific context.  First, communications should be thought of not only 
as “transmission systems,”93 but also in terms of their special role as 
channels carrying and disseminating information and content.  Second, 
it must be acknowledged that changes in the telecommunications 
industry induce profound socio-economic changes and that these two 
sets of changes are interdependent.94 
 Against the complex background, noted above, we should now try 
to apply our “empty concept” of universal service.  This exercise is in 
line with the approach suggested by Jayakar and Sawhney of 
examining universal service options in terms of a possibility space, 
where policy innovations can take place.95 In that sense, our “objective 
is not so much to identify a list of possible instruments, but to expose 
our self-imposed boundaries and to suggest new possibilities for 
universal service.”96 
 
 
92 Castells, The Information Age, supra note 76, at 356, referring to Neil Postman, Amusing 
Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (New York: Penguin, 
1985), 15 (abridged in the original).  See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 1999), http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5740 (accessed 
October. 1, 2006) (he famously noted, at 5.6, that: “The limits of my language mean the limits 
of my world” (in the original: “Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner 
Welt”)). 
93 Framework Directive, supra note 36, at Article 2(a). 
94 Knud Erik Skouby, “Information Societies: Toward a More Useful Concept,” in Mansell, 
Samarajva, and Mahan, eds., Networking Knowledge, supra note 7, at 176, referring to the 
work of William H. Melody.  See, e.g., William H. Melody, “Technological, Economic and 
Institutional Aspects of Computer/Telecommunications Systems,” in OECD, Applications of 
Computer/Telecommunications Systems (Paris: OECD, 1975); William H. Melody, 
“Identifying Priorities for Building Distinct Information Societies,” The Economic and Social 
Review 28, no. 3 (1996): 177-184; William H. Melody, “Policy Research in the Information 
Society,” in Information and Communication Technologies: Visions and Realities, ed. William 
H. Dutton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 303-317; William H. Melody, “Human 
Capital in Information Economies,” New Media and Society 1, no. 1 (1999): 39-46. 
95 Jayakar and Sawhney, “Universal Service,” supra note 6, at 340 (emphasis added).  For an 
excellent overview of the emerging of proposals, see ibid., 351-354. 
96 Ibid., 340. 
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A.  BEYOND THE TELEPHONE 
 As telecommunication networks reach saturation, as multimedia 
platforms proliferate, and as the concept of scarcity is being 
reformulated, it is clear that universal access in the form of POTS 
(plain old telephone service) is becoming inadequate.  While some 
hold that universal service policies should simply be abolished,97 a 
strong group of voices is calling for a “next generation” universal 
service, albeit they are doing so with little coherence.98 
 The importance of “being connected” to a network as a means of 
communication is likely to remain unchanged,99 or may even increase 
in response to the more intensive interconnectedness and its value in 
the Information Society.  We deem however competitive 
telecommunications markets as sufficient to guarantee the ubiquity of 
and inclusion in the network.  The POTS definition of USO will be, 
pursuant to the principles of technological and network neutrality, 
reformulated as “access to networks,” rather than access to particular 
services.100  The stress within the triangle of equality, continuity, and 
affordability is likely to shift towards the last of the three values.  
Beyond the internalizing and redistributional considerations, in the 
context of increasing the value of the communications network as a 
public good, there may be a need to re-think the accessibility and 
functionality of networks.101  “First mile”102 issues, in the sense of 
 
 
97 See, e.g., Roberta G. Lentz, “The E-volution of the Digital Divide in the US: A Mayhem of 
Competing Metrics,” info 2, no. 4 (2000): 355-377; Benjamin M. Compaine, “Information 
Gaps: Myth or Reality?” in The Digital Divide: Facing a Crisis or Creating a Myth?, ed. 
Benjamin M. Compaine (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 105-118. 
98 Jayakar and Sawhney, “Universal Service,” supra note 6, at 340. 
99 On the social and economic effects of being connected, see Benjamin M. Compaine and 
Mitchell J. Weinraub, “Universal Access to Online Services; An Examination of the Issue,” 
Telecommunications Policy 21, no. 1 (1997): 15-33, referring also to Ithiel de Sola Pool, The 
Social Impact of the Telephone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977); Ithiel de Sola Pool, 
Forecasting the Telephone: A Retrospective Technology Assessment of the Telephone 
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1983).  See also European Commission, “Liberalisation of Network 
Industries,” supra note 2, at 172-176. 
100 A proposal that was also considered by the European Commission.  See European 
Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome, supra note 43, at 6. 
101 Gerard Goggin and Christopher Newell, “An End to Disabling Policies?: Towards 
Enlightened Universal Service,” The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 127-133. 
102 A phrase used by Sharon Strover.  See Sharon Strover, “The First Mile,” The Information 
Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 151-154. 
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how connectivity is perceived from the subscriber’s perspective, could 
also become essential.  Connectivity in this broader sense may 
encapsulate network interface devices, software and training, as well 
as incentives to create content and contribute to the community.103  It 
corresponds to the implications of the contemporary Information 
Society as elaborated in the preceding section.  In this context and 
going beyond the telephone, we consider two elements as particularly 
critical for the future shape of universal service policies.  These are 
innovation and content and are o
B.  INNOVATION 
 There is a three-way connection between innovation104 and 
universal service.  First, innovation and the resulting technological 
advances in telecommunications “reduce the cost and accelerate the 
timescale of progress towards universal services goals, which tends to 
be a slow and costly process.”105  Second, innovation “affects the ways 
individuals and households organize their lives, and the ways 
government and business conduct their activities.”106  Some 
technologies, such as digitization, as we have argued above, may 
trigger processes that go beyond the availability of more gadgets and 
profoundly change the face of the industry and our lives.  In that sense, 
innovation instigates the formulation of new contents for universal 
service, since “innovations in telecommunication services affect the 
specific meaning that people attach to the concept of universal service, 
so that kinds of telecommunication service now regarded as necessities 
[…] include features that were previously considered to be 
luxuries.”107 This stresses the need for constant awareness of the 
 
103 Ibid.; On the importance of training, see, e.g., Sharon Eisner Gillett, “Universal Service: 
Defining the Policy Goal in the Age of the Internet,” The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 
147-149. 
104 Innovation is understood here in its broadest meaning of research and development, 
invention and creation of new technologies, products and services (endogenous innovation), as 
well as the adoption of these by the relevant markets (exogenous innovation). 
105Michael Tyler, William Letwin, and Christopher Roe, “Universal Service and Innovation in 
Telecommunication Services,” Telecommunications Policy 19, no. 1 (1995): 3-20; Ibid., 18. 
106 Ibid., 19.  See also PEW Internet & American Life Project, Internet Penetration and 
Impact (April 26, 2006), http://www.pewinternet.org/ (accessed October. 1, 2006). 
107 Tyler, Letwin, and Roe, “Universal Service and Innovation,” supra note 105, at 3.  Mobile 
telephony is a lucid example in this regard. 
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dynamism of universal service, which in practical terms means 
providing for mechanisms for reviewing the scope of USOs, as the 
example of the EC universal service regime shows.108 
 Third, and more unusually, USOs could be seen as a driver of 
innovation.109  Increasingly endowed with a critical role in modern 
economies, innovation is linked to the goal of governments to achieve 
sustainability.110  As the history of the telecommunications industry 
reveals, innovation has been its driving force from the outset.111 
Furthermore, communications markets exhibit network effects,112 
which make the innovation cycle uneven, since the adoption of a 
certain technology by the end-users is highly dependent on their 
expectations of the size of the future network.  Under such 
circumstances, the demand for, and the adoption of, new technologies 
which are an essential part of the innovation process, could be 
predetermined by the lock-in effects113 of existing large networks (the 
 
108 See European Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome, supra note 43. 
109 François Bar and Annemarie Munk Riis, “From Welfare to Innovation: Toward a New 
Rationale for Universal Service” (Conference Paper, the 26th Telecommunications Policy 
Research Conference, Alexandria, VA, October 3-5, 1998), http://tprc.org/agenda98.htm 
(accessed July 11, 2006).  See also François Bar and Annemarie Munk Riis, “Tapping User-
Driven Innovation: A New Rationale for Universal Service,” The Information Society 16, no. 2 
(2000): 99-108. 
110 See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Alexander Wagner, and Gernot Wagner, “Interpreting 
Sustainability in Economic Terms: Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity” 
(Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2002-02, Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, May 2002).  See also Marc Bourreau and Pinar 
Doğan, “Regulation and Innovation in the Telecommunications Industry,” 
Telecommunications Policy 25, no. 3 (2001): 167-168. 
111 For evidence, see Knut Blind, et al., “New Products and Services: Analysis of Regulations 
Shaping New Markets,” Fraunhofer Institute Systems and Innovation Research Study funded 
by the European Commission (Karlsruhe, February 2004), 76; Bourreau and Doğan, 
“Regulation and Innovation,” supra note 111, at 169. 
112 On network effects, see Stanley J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Network 
Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, no. 2 (1994): 1-
26; Stanley J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Are Network Externalities a New Source 
of Market Failure?” Research in Law and Economics 17 (1995): 1-22; Carl Shapiro and Hal R. 
Varian, Information Rules (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999); Nicholas 
Economides, “The Economics of Networks,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 
16, no. 4 (1996): 673-699; Heli Koski and Tobias Kretschmer, “Survey on Competing in 
Network Industries: Firm Strategies, Market Outcomes, and Policy Implications,” Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade (Bank Papers) (2004): 5-31. 
113 Victor Stango defines a “lock-in” as “a situation in which economic agents’ equilibrium 
decisions regarding standards adoption yield lower social welfare than an alternative.”  See 
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most notorious example of which is the Windows operating 
system114).  A path dependent of adoption115 emerges in that regard, 
which is difficult to overcome (including in a case of availability of a 
superior technology116) and influences the stimuli for innovation.  In 
that context, universal service policy could “foster linked 
objectives”117 and “stimulate the creation of a broad-based society of 
lay users for advanced ICT, whose participation in successful 
interaction with suppliers is key to the breadth of the ICT innovation 
process […] increas[ing] the total range and number of information 
technology innovations and at the same time decreas[ing] the 
proportion of ‘unsatisfactory innovations.’”118 To put it simply, this 
means that the government can either stimulate the adoption of certain 
technologies (which is, however, not technologically neutral) or may 
increase the awareness and the knowledge as to how available and/or 
new advanced technologies could be applied.  This would also 
contribute to the various governmental projects on Information Society 
linked to the instrumentalization of ICTs for the achievement of a 
variety of public interest goals, such as inclusion, growth, and 
improved pu 119
 
Victor Stango, “The Economics of Standards Wars,” Review of Network Economics 1, no. 1 
(2004): 4.  See also Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, supra note 113, at 103-171. 
114 See Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, COM(04) 900 final and Order of the 
President of the Court of First Instance, Proceedings for interim relief – Article 82 EC in Case 
T-201/04 R Microsoft v. Commission of the European Communities (Dec. 22, 2004), Eur. O.J. 
C69/16 (March 19, 2005). 
115 Stango, “The Economics of Standards Wars,” supra note 113, at 5. 
116 See, e.g., Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic 
Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 332-337; Paul A. David, “Path Dependence and the Quest for 
Historical Economics: One More Chorus of the Ballad of QWERTY,” University of Oxford 
Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, no. 20 (1997). 
117 A phrase used by Tyler and Letwin and Roe in “Universal Service and Innovation in 
Telecommunication Services,” supra note 106. 
118 Bar and Riis, “From Welfare to Innovation,” supra note 109, at 17. 
119 Such types of project are prominent in the European regulatory space (for the current 
project, see European Commission, i2010 – A European Information Society for Growth and 
Employment, supra note 73), but not exclusively European (see, e.g., Castells, The 
Information Age, supra note 76, at 394-395). 
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C.  ACCESS TO CONTENT 
 Besides the newly formulated tasks of universal service in terms of 
access to networks and innovation, we argue that in the longer-term 
evolution of the Information Society, the idea of universal access will 
need to be extended to include content.  This may have different 
dimensions.  One dimension may address access to basic information, 
such as certain kinds of public information regarding health, 
education, transportation, or government informational resources.120  
In the context of ongoing and increasing convergence121 between the 
telecommunications and media sectors, it may also be essential to 
consider the possibilities of addressing universal service issues in these 
domains simultaneously.122  However in acknowledging the difference 
between information and communication resources,123 one should not 
overstate the issues related to access to information.  As Compaine and 
Weinraub lucidly point out,  
[a]lthough news about the society around them is considered 
by many to be vital to every voting citizen in a democratic 
society, here too there has never been a serious movement to 
subsidize a newspaper on every doorstep or a radio on every 
kitchen table.  In this case, most societies have chosen to 
 
120 See Robin Mansell, “Designing Networks to Capture Customers: Policy and Regulation 
Issues for the New Telecom Environment,” in Melody, “Policy Objectives and Models of 
Regulation,” supra note 18, at 85-86. 
121 On convergence, see Colin R. Blackman, “Convergence between Telecommunications and 
Other Media,” Telecommunications Policy 22, no. 3 (1998): 163-170; P.H. Longstaff, “New 
Ways to Think about the Visions Called ‘Convergence’: A Guide for Business and Public 
Policy,” Program on Information Resources Policy (Harvard University, April 2000); OECD, 
The Implications of Convergence for Regulation of Electronic Communications, 
DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2003)5/final (July 12, 2004); Damien Geradin and David Luff, eds., The 
WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Milton L. Mueller, “Convergence: A Reality 
Check,” in The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual 
Services, ed. Damien Geradin and David Luff, 311-322; Pierre Larouche, “Dealing with 
Convergence at the International Level,” in The WTO and Global Convergence in 
Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services, ed. Damien Geradin and David Luff, 390-
422. 
122 See Simpson, “Universal Service Issues,” supra note 19. 
123 Compaine and Weinraub, “Universal Access to Online Services,” supra note 99, at 32-33. 
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post the daily newspaper in a public space, either in the town 
center or the public library.124   
In that sense, following our previous elaborations and the suggestions 
by Harmeet Sawhney, hybrid models may be created where uniform 
solutions are formulated for resources used in the communication 
mode, while a segmented approach is applied for resources in the 
information access mode.125 
 An arguably more vital dimension of access relates to the broader 
context of human rights and, in particular, to the freedom of 
expression.126  As we have argued above, in the Information Society, 
information has become the single most important element.  Therefore, 
greater participation in the production and processing of information 
needs to be expedited.  For instance, the latest Pew Internet Report 
shows that as of March 2006 forty-two percent of all American adults 
had a high-speed Internet connection at home,127 and thirty-five 
percent of all Internet users have posted content there, the large 
majority of them being home broadband users.128  Following this line 
of reasoning, we argue that there is a new type of participatory culture 
emerging129 and it is crucial that a certain minimum of access is 
provided for all.  This relates not only to freedom of expression as a 
 
124 Ibid., 31. 
125 Harmeet Sawhney, “Universal Service: Separating the Grain of Truth from the Proverbial 
Chaff,” The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 161-164. 
126 The right of freedom of opinion and expression is safeguarded in the majority of national 
constitutions.  On the international level, it is formulated in Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, GA Resolution 217 A(iii), UN Doc.A/810 (December 10, 
1948), as including “freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”  It is reiterated in 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Resolution 2200 
A(xxi), UN Doc.A/6316 (1966), thereby making it binding to the parties.  As of September 19, 
2006, 157 countries were parties to the Covenant. 
127 Which is a 40 percent increase in numbers of Americans with high-speed Internet 
(compared to the 30 percent growth of 2005). 
128 See PEW Internet & American Life Project, “Home Broadband Adoption 2006,” (May 28, 
2006), http://www.pewinternet.org/ (accessed October 1, 2006). 
129 See, e.g., Urs Gasser and Silke Ernst, “From Shakespeare to DJ Danger Mouse: A Quick 
Look at Copyright and User Creativity in the Digital Age,” Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society Research Publication, no. 2006-05 (June 2006).  See also PEW Internet & American 
Life Project, supra note 84. 
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fundamental right that in its institutional aspect130 needs to be secured 
by the state, but also to freedom of expression as guaranteeing and 
enabling cultural diversity,131 the protection of which is critical in light 
of the implications of the changed communications environment 
sketched above.132  The so-construed “access to content” is distinct 
from the conventional question of whether USOs should include 
broadband.133  Although the inclusion of broadband in the scope of 
USOs allowing unlimited access to the Internet will clearly facilitate 
access to content, the mere availability and affordability of broadband 
does not exhaust the issues of access to content in the above-
mentioned contexts of access to public information and cultural 
diversity. 
 
130 Graber, Handel und Kultur, supra note 87, at 100. 
131 See Article 4(1) of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, adopted at the 33rd Session of the General Conference of UNESCO 
(October 20, 2005).  On cultural diversity, see, e.g., Joost Smiers, Arts under Pressure (New 
York: Zed Books, 2004); the collection of contributions in Christoph Beat Graber, Michael 
Girsberger, and Mira Nenova, eds., Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity (Zurich: Schulthess, 
2004); Christoph Beat Graber, “The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: A 
Counterbalance to the WTO?” Journal of International Economic Law 9, no. 3 (2006): 553-
574. 
132 “Freedom of expression, media pluralism, multilingualism, equal access to art and to 
scientific and technological knowledge, including in digital form, and the possibility for all 
cultures to have access to the means of expression and dissemination are the guarantees of 
cultural diversity.”  See Article 2(1) of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions, supra note 132. 
133 See, e.g., European Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome, supra note 43.  
Currently, in the EC, although universal service includes a connection to the public telephone 
network at a fixed location, this requirement is limited to a single narrowband network 
connection, the provision of which may be restricted by member states to the end-user's 
primary location/residence and does not extend to the Integrated Services Digital Network 
(ISDN).  Connections to the public telephone network (wired or wireless) at a fixed location 
should however be capable of supporting speech and data communications at rates sufficient 
for access to online services, such as those provided via the public Internet.  The speed of 
Internet access experienced by a given user may depend on a number of factors, including the 
provider(s) of Internet connectivity, as well as the given application for which a connection is 
being used.  The data rate that can be supported by a single narrowband connection to the 
public telephone network depends on the capabilities of the subscriber's terminal equipment, 
as well as the connection.  For this reason, the EC has not mandated a specific data or bit rate 
at the Community level.  In specific cases, where the connection to the public telephony 
network is clearly insufficient to support satisfactory Internet access, member states should be 
able to require the connection to be brought up to the level enjoyed by the majority of 
subscribers so that it supports data rates sufficient for access to the Internet.  See Universal 
Service Directive, supra note 36, at Recital 8. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Universal service programs are not outdated and remain necessary 
in the digital networked environment.  Past rationales for universal 
service policies were based primarily on welfare and network 
externalities.  In the new communications system, however, there are 
new justifications and a new potential for universal service packages.  
This does not mean that universal service should be simply expanded 
beyond POTS to include PANS (pretty amazing new stuff).  This 
would be contrary to the fundamental notion of universal service as 
resting upon the principles of equality, continuity, and affordability 
and stemming from the fundamental rights of the citizens.  We deem it 
most important in the discussions of future universal service models to 
go back to precisely these underlying ideas and let go of the telephony 
legacy, which is heavily loaded with lobbyists’ arguments and is 
becoming increasingly inadequate.  The conceptualization of 
communications and information networks as a public good could be 
of particular importance in the debates of universal service − citizens 
are to be thought of not only as consumers but also members of the 
political society.134 
 We should be pragmatic, however, and not expect brave new USO 
models.  “In fact, there are many reasons favoring a go slow policy 
that involves economics, the rate of technological change, and political 
reality.”135  The question of who pays will also certainly remain core 
to the discussion, although one should not equate the benefits of 
universal service policy with its costs.136  
 During the debates that will ultimately lead to the political will for 
transforming the contents and/or mechanisms of universal service, it is 
vital that the developments within the communications sector 
 
134 Mark Freedland, “Law, Public Services, and Citizenship – New Domains, New Regimes?” 
in Public Services and Citizenship, ed. Freedland and Sciarra, supra note 65, at 8-11. 
135 Compaine and Weinraub, “Universal Access to Online Services,” supra note 99, at 27.  Eli 
Skogerbø and Tanja Storsul, for instance, analyze telecommunications policies in Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and Norway and show that business actors are well networked and are 
pressing for a minimal definition of universal service, while actors supporting an extended 
definition are less coordinated and less successful.  The authors conclude that it is unlikely that 
universal services will be defined more extensively in the future.  See Eli Skogerbø and Tanja 
Storsul, “Prospects for Expanded Universal Service in Europe: The Cases of Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Norway,” The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 135-146. 
136 See European Commission, “Liberalisation of Network Industries,” supra note 2, at 176-
178. 
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(technologies, market restructuring, and private actors’ actions137) and 
within the broader Information Society as complex adaptive 
systems138 are vigilantly observed.  While market forces should be 
given priority, the potential of universal service as a tool of state 
intervention for safeguarding pubic interest objectives in increasingly 
deregulated communications markets should be appro
139assessed.
 
137 For instance, Google’s role in providing wireless access to Internet (Wi-Fi) in the city of 
San Francisco.  See “Google Offers San Francisco Wi-Fi for Free: Company’s Bid Is One of 
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Wirelessly,” The New York Times, July 14, 2006. 
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17, 20 et seq., http://www.pirp.harvard.edu (accessed October 1, 2006).  
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economic interest,” which is arguably another instrument that could be applied for the 
achievement of public interest goals.  Notably, in contrast to “services of general economic 
interest,” universal service involves no derogation from EC or national competition rules and 
thus remains within the market mechanism.  See EC Treaty, Article 86(2).  See also Nihoul 
and Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 5.265-5.336; Vito 
Aurucchio, “Services of General Economic Interest and the Application of EC Competition 
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